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BOOK REVIEWS

“A WAR NOT YET FINISHED”
Ricks, Thomas E. The Gamble: General David Petraeus and the American Military Adventure in Iraq,
2006–2008. New York: Penguin, 2009. 394pp. $27.95

Thomas Ricks begins his latest chronicle of the American strategic experience
in Iraq where he left off in Fiasco
(2006). In this account, Ricks uses his
familiar journalistic approach to describe how the civilian and military
leaders arrived at a change of policy and
strategy, commonly known as “the
surge,” in the war in Iraq. Ricks’s new
book appears to be more even in its
treatment of the leaders and the new
strategy than was Fiasco, with its prosecutorial tone. In spite of his upbeat assessment of the American leaders,
however, Ricks ends this volume with
measured, if not pessimistic, projections for the future of Iraq.

his watch, Odierno relied on Keane and
American Enterprise Institute strategist
Fred Kagan to change the direction of
the strategy in Iraq. They sought to
change the strategy of transitioning
power to corrupt and impotent Iraqi security forces into a new strategy of providing security for the Iraqi people. The
most remarkable aspect of Ricks’s story
is that this change in strategy developed
outside the president’s designated National Security team and against the
recommendations of the Joint Chiefs
and the Iraq Study Group. According to
Ricks, Keane and Kagan clearly led the
way in the White House to get more
American combat forces into Iraq.

Ricks covers familiar developments described in Bob Woodward’s The War
Within, but he sheds new light on the
role of General Ray Odierno in pushing
for a change of strategy. Specifically,
Ricks recounts how Odierno corresponded with his mentor and old boss,
retired general Jack Keane, to change
the “bridging strategy” then advocated
by Generals George Casey and John
Abizaid, and by the Pentagon leadership. Not wanting to lose this war on

Ricks describes in some detail how
events in al Anbar province greatly influenced a key aspect of the new strategy.
The Marines’ experience with the reconciliation movement, or “Sunni Awakening,” of tribal leaders in al Anbar in 2005
and 2006 was the pivotal instance showing how to turn former belligerents into
potential allies. In effect, the American
forces in al Anbar were already practicing the tactics and techniques of the new
counterinsurgency (COIN) manual
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recently published by General David
Petraeus and a Fort Leavenworth team.
Ricks highlights how Odierno adopted
this new COIN approach in the employment of the five surged combat brigades. Instead of putting all the
additional forces into central Baghdad
to “secure the people,” Odierno deployed them into the fractious “Baghdad belts.” During the surge, American
troops would not only live among the
Iraqi people in “joint security stations”
and combat outposts but also target the
insurgent lines of operations running
from Syria and Iran into central
Baghdad.
Overall, this appears to be a balanced
narrative of a war not yet finished. In
the last section Ricks considers the lasting effects of the “surge” strategy pursued in 2006–2008. He winds up with a
discussion of that famous Petraeus
question of 2003, “How does this end?”
Ricks notes that perhaps this war does
not end. Clausewitz declared, “Even the
ultimate outcome of war is not always
to be regarded as final”; in Ricks’s view,
that will be true of the outcome of this
war.
JON SCOTT LOGEL

Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army
Naval War College

Deudney, Daniel H. Bounding Power: Republican
Security Theory from the Polis to the Global Village.
Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 2007.
391pp. $17.96

Paradoxically, this is one of the most
innovative yet least original books
written in the past decade on the theory and practice of international relations. Daniel Deudney synthesizes a
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broad understanding of the history of
Western political theory with an
equally broad study of contemporary
world politics to recover what he calls
“republican security theory.” He sees
this theory as having developed from
the Greek polis through the Italian Renaissance to the Enlightenment (in the
thought of Montesquieu especially), to
the American founding to the present,
and as having important implications
for nuclear proliferation and disarmament in the “global village” of our
time. Deudney demonstrates conclusively that the leading schools of international relations today—realism and
liberal internationalism—are both intellectual “fragments” of this older tradition, with the fragmentation often
obstructing practical efforts to reconcile security from external threats to
the liberty of public citizens and private individuals.
Such a reconciliation is the raison d’être
of republican security theory and practice, though as Deudney shows, the viability of the endeavor depends on
learning much from the school of hard
knocks. Twenty-five hundred years ago,
the members of the Delian League
sought to secure their independence
from Persia by following the leadership
of Athens, but in so doing they jumped
from the frying pan of external anarchy
into the fire of Athenian imperialism.
The Roman republic, if only because its
more inclusive approach to citizenship
enabled it to grow stronger as it expanded, proved more successful at uniting external security with internal
liberty than had Athens or the Delian
League, but ultimately it got too big.
Generals like Caesar, Pompey, and Augustus were able to count on the private
loyalty of soldiers to help them establish
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despotic power on the ruins of republican freedom. Studying this checkered
past with care, both Niccolò Machiavelli (whom some see as the founder of realism) and Charles de Secondat, Baron
de Montesquieu (who could be considered a founder of liberal internationalism), sought ways to combine the
security advantages of large empires
with the freedom (from military rule
especially) of healthy republics.
What practical use might this mixed
success of republican security theory be
today? Clearly, it lies at the origins of
the two grandest experiments in international cooperation of the twentieth
century––the League of Nations and the
United Nations. Rather than view the
less-than-complete success, and sometimes patent failure, of either as proof
that republican security theory has
reached a point of diminishing returns,
Deudney concludes with an analysis of
how early experiments in nuclear arms
control might suggest ways to apply republican security theory to avoid the
danger of nuclear violence while preserving individual freedom. In this respect, Deudney appears to have more in
common with contemporary liberal internationalists than with today’s realists, but he has no patience with charges
that his project is utopian. It has
worked in the past, and it continues to
work in the American union. With
enough intelligence and determination,
he argues, it might be the only practicable solution to the global problems of
this century, which no single state can
address on its own. In making this
claim, Deudney has gone, like the
starship Enterprise (which served a federation of republics!) where few today
have gone before, to help found a new
discipline, one that might be called
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“world political theory.” At a time
when U.S. maritime strategy has become ever more concerned with the
security of the global system, this is a
book that thoughtful strategists will
need to read again and again.
KARL WALLING

Naval War College

Coicaud, Jean-Marc. Beyond the National Interest. Washington D.C.: United States Institute of
Peace Press, 2007. 297pp. $19.95

It should come as little surprise that
Jean-Marc Coicaud, a noted French
scholar with extensive experience at the
United Nations, sees the need for a fundamental change in the way the international system addresses its most
pressing security problems. He bemoans the fact that “narrow national
interests” have made prompt, effective
multilateral peacekeeping interventions
on behalf of humanitarian needs very
difficult. In his Beyond the National Interest he offers prescriptions to alleviate
this situation.
This short book covers in some detail
the history of international humanitarian interventions since the 1990s, in
search of trends and lessons learned.
The author conveys a sense of optimism
that the end of the Cold War presented
a perfect opportunity for universal human values to displace traditional values according to which sovereignty was
sacrosanct and nation-states responded
only to direct external threat. He optimistically proclaims that NATO was
moving forward progressively in this
direction.
Unfortunately, his detailed historical
examples consistently belie this
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optimism, as some protagonist (normally the United States) always allows
its conduct to be driven by the atavistic
notions of sovereignty and physical security. In fact, the United States (particularly the last Bush administration)
comes out as the book’s principal villain, although the Clinton administration also takes its hits. Owing to its
superpower status, the United States is
directly involved in every incident in
which humanitarian intervention is a
possible course of action, and its
responses never meet the author’s high
standards.
While Coicaud’s facts and historical
analysis are correct and fundamentally
sound, a reader might get the impression that it is only a matter of time before the entire world is persuaded to see
the responsibility to protect––the international community sending in forces
to protect the citizens of an offending
country––much as an enlightened European does now. I am certain that
Coicaud is buoyed by the advent of the
Obama administration in hopes that
the United States will eventually join in
this enlightenment. Unfortunately, his
optimism is probably misplaced, for
two reasons. First, none of today’s
emergent powers (China, Russia, India,
or Brazil) have been proponents of
what the author calls “conditional” sovereignty. If anything, they hold dearly
their sovereignty and support this right
for other nation-states. The second
point forces us to focus on the title of
the book.
That is, national interest is the real culprit. As long as nations constitute the
world’s central cast, there is little likelihood that it will achieve Coicaud’s
idealistic standards. Even his recommendations to strengthen the United

https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol62/iss3/11

Nation’s peace-enforcement and
humanitarian roles are largely bureaucratic and peripheral, suggesting that
the author is also aware of the fundamental resistance. As long as the UN
remains nationally based, the likelihood that its members will be driven
by “supranational” interests will be
slim. Indeed, simply getting beyond the
national interest is not enough. The international community must adopt supranational interests or it will forever
be hampered by the primacy of “security issues” and “self-centered nationalism,” which, unfortunately for
Coicaud, is likely to be a long time
coming.
Although a welcome addition to those
advocating for the rights of individuals
over those of nation-states, the book
unfortunately fails to deal meaningfully
with the real obstacles to the ideal. Further, since much of this book is a diatribe against the Bush administration,
its salience is increasingly historical.
TOM FEDYSZYN

Naval War College

Cohen, William A. A Class with Drucker: The Lost
Lessons of the World’s Greatest Management
Teacher. New York: AMACOM, 2008. 248pp.
$24.95
Krames, Jeffrey A. Inside Drucker’s Brain. New
York: Penguin, 2008. 257pp. $24.95

Peter Drucker, considered the father of
modern management, died in 2005 at
the age of ninety-five. For six decades
he consulted with industry and government leaders and taught at New York
University and the Claremont Graduate
School of Management, publishing
thirty-nine books, including one on
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Japanese art. Drucker’s principles of
leadership, responsibility, management,
and strategy transcended organizational
mission, whether for-profit, nonprofit,
or military.
It is not surprising that several books
about Drucker have been published
since his death. One interesting one, A
Class with Drucker, is by Bill Cohen.
Cohen graduated from West Point and
was a PhD student of Drucker’s. He
served as a major general in the Air
Force reserves, worked in the defense
industry, and remained in touch with
Drucker for thirty years. The goal of
Cohen’s book is to share lessons from
Drucker’s classroom.
Peter Drucker was an exceptional
thinker and writer. His perspectives on
organizations were refreshingly unorthodox and expressed with piercing
logic. Drucker drew deeply from global
history and economics. Although he
was an academic, his audience was the
practitioner. Ethics and social responsibility themes permeated his writing and
teaching. Many concepts that are now
part of everyday organizational vocabulary originated with Peter Drucker, such
as management by objectives, knowledge workers, decentralized management, and strategic leadership in
business.
Two things make Cohen’s book interesting. One is Drucker’s influence as his
mentor and teacher, and the other is his
own military perspective. Cohen interweaves Drucker’s concepts of leadership, strategy, ethics, and professional
development with his own military education and experiences, often adding
candid personal reflection and revealing
anecdotes.
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One revelation emerged during a class
session when a student asked Drucker
how he got started as a “management
consultant.” Drucker talked about being mobilized for World War II, armed
only with a PhD and experience in economics. Drucker’s job classification in
the Army was “consultant,” but neither
he nor his colonel had any idea what
that entailed. Drucker started asking the
colonel about the group’s goals and resources, and a few days later he went
back with a report of priorities and alternatives. As it turned out, the group
was quite successful in its mission.
Cohen affirms that Drucker’s principles
of strategy and leadership are tightly
coupled to personal responsibility, and
he elaborates on the distinctive challenges between tactical and strategic decisions for the military leader. The
strategic leader must persistently ask
the right questions; as Drucker would
state, “You can’t get there unless you
know where there is.” To be a strategic
leader, one must avoid developing
strategy by formula and instead devote
time to self-development by expanding
one’s knowledge and perspective.
Drucker’s advice for professional development was to “read, write, listen and
teach . . . and strive for expertise in an
area outside your profession.”
Drucker lectured his students about
what to do, not how to do it. Cohen
sometimes takes a Drucker principle
and expounds on it using his own
“boilerplate” advice. Some of the elaborations are unremarkable, but others
are a genuine fusing of Drucker’s influence with the author’s experience.
Another book on the subject published
about the same time is Inside Drucker’s
Brain, by Jeffrey Krames, a seasoned
writer who has written extensively on
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General Electric’s Jack Welch. In 2002
he published a work on Donald
Rumsfeld and his leadership style.
Krames’s new book draws on a six-hour
interview that took place in Drucker’s
home about two years before he died, as
well as upon Drucker’s writings. As
Krames sat down for the first (and apparently only) interview, Drucker mentioned that Jack Welch had sat in that
same upholstered chair twenty years
earlier, just before Welch became the
legendary CEO of General Electric.
The goal of Krames’s book is to capture
the relevance of Drucker’s most important management philosophies and
strategies. Reading this book, one gets
the sense that the author wants to ensure that Drucker’s contribution to
management knowledge does not
diminish with time.
His concern has merit. Drucker’s career
path was varied and unconventional, so
he was never really viewed as a true academic, especially by other academics.
Krames points out that although
Drucker had a seminal influence on
such leaders as Welch, Tom Peters, Jim
Collins, Michael Dell, Andy Grove, and
Bill Gates, Drucker is rarely referenced
in management textbooks. Perhaps one
reason is that Drucker was not a
self-promoter. You will not find a
Drucker Consulting Group, spin-off
publications, or Drucker training workshops. Drucker declared, “My aim has
never been academic, that is, to be recognized; it has always been to make a
difference.”
Like Cohen, Krames centers on leadership, strategy, and social responsibility,
covering much of the same ground.
However, Krames has more of a business and historical perspective than
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Cohen, who writes from a military vantage point. Each book makes its own
unique contribution. For instance,
Krames’s extensive insights into General Electric amplify the little-known
influence Drucker had on the company
and its iconic leaders. On the question
of whether leaders are born or made,
Drucker said that some leaders are naturals (like Welch) but that there are not
enough of them—so leaders have to be
made! That is one of the reasons why
General Electric has done so well; the
company has been developing leaders at
its renowned Crotonville Training Center since the 1950s. Drucker was a
founder of Crotonville, along with
Ralph Cordiner, General Electric’s CEO
at the time. For readers interested in
where great leaders get their ideas, the
book’s chapter entitled “Drucker on
Welch” is quite interesting.
However, it seems presumptuous to say
that after only one interview and a few
letters, the author got “inside Drucker’s
brain.” The reader is left wondering
why there was no second or third
interview.
HANK KNISKERN

Naval War College

Wukovits, John. One Square Mile of Hell: The Battle for Tarawa. New York: New American Library,
2006. 320pp. $15

One Square Mile of Hell relates the story
of the November 1943 battle for the
Tarawa Atoll from the personal level of
the Marines who endured this remarkably bloody fight. John Wukovits makes
use of firsthand interviews with veterans of the operation, while also citing
personal letters and diaries. The result
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is a personal history that draws the
reader into the lives of the corpsmen,
privates, lieutenants, and colonels who
grimly made their way across the
central Pacific.
As events unfold, Wukovits traces the
lives of several Marines as their paths
converge on Tarawa. The marriage proposals and strong family ties ominously
set the stage for the tragedies that
would follow, although the general historical discussion of the war leading up
to Tarawa is at times made awkward by
the intermixed personal story lines.
The assault on Betio, a strip of sand and
coconut trees two miles long and half a
mile wide, became a bloody slugfest.
There was little room to hide or maneuver on the island, and the frontal assaults by the Marines produced
unprecedented casualty ratios. As a battalion commander emphasized to his
men, there were two choices: move forward or die. Complicating the operation was the fact that amphibious
planners had utilized outdated charts
and inadequate tide tables to determine
water levels over the island’s outer reefs,
resulting in numerous groundings and
unnecessary exposure to enemy fire. After three days of brutal, hand-to-hand
fighting, the Marines subdued the
Japanese defenders and claimed a costly
victory.
A common theme of the accounts is the
incredibly adverse battle conditions.
The limited space and high casualties
resulted in a layer of death and carnage
over the entire island. The equatorial
sun and legions of flies added to the
misery, but it was the smell of death
and decay that lingered in one’s mind.
“The smell was inescapable,” wrote a
correspondent; “it evoked instant and
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nightmarish memories. . . . Betio was
nothing but stink and death.”
Besides being a testament to the courageous leadership and fighting spirit of
the Marine Corps, the Tarawa operation raised questions in 1943 regarding
the degree of force that should be employed in war. The issue has been continually debated following the dropping
of atomic bombs on Japan, and it is still
argued today in connection with harsh
interrogation techniques used on
suspected terrorists.
Time reporter Robert Sherrod, who accompanied the Marines during the
Betio landing, struggled to reconcile
what he saw at Tarawa with the clean,
edited version of war presented to the
American home front. “Americans,” he
wrote, “are not prepared psychologically to accept the cruel facts of war.”
Sherrod’s observation makes One
Square Mile of Hell poignant indeed for
Americans today.
While it is noble to memorialize the
courage and sacrifice of the Marines at
Tarawa, it is equally important to remind ourselves that victory comes at a
steep price. Sherrod regarded the carnage of Tarawa as “the most haunting
memory of World War II.” Indeed, the
story of Tarawa should haunt all
Americans.
RONALD R. SHAW, JR.

Commander, U.S. Navy
Naval War College

Fischer, David Hackett. Champlain’s Dream: The
European Founding of North America. New York:
Simon and Schuster, 2008. 834pp. $40

David Hackett Fischer writes of Samuel
de Champlain, who founded French
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Quebec four hundred years ago, that
“[Champlain] wrote thousands of pages
about what he did, but only a few words
about who he was.” It is well for our
own and future generations that
Fischer, in his Champlain’s Dream, has
now splendidly written about both the
admirable man and his remarkable
deeds. In this, another of his signature
and wonderfully readable narrative histories (he is also the author of the majestic 1989 Albion’s Seed and the
Pulitzer Prize–winning Washington’s
Crossing of 2004), Fischer presents
Champlain as a master mariner, explorer, cartographer, ethnologist, courtier, and soldier, but above all as a
deeply humane person in a world that
was anything but. Fischer writes that
Champlain “had a dream of humanity
and peace in a world of cruelty and violence. He envisioned a new world as a
place where people of different cultures
could live together in amity and
concord. This became his grand design
for North America.”
Champlain pursued this grand design
with astounding skill, perseverance, and
stamina, crossing the North Atlantic
twenty-seven times between 1599 and
1635 without losing a single major ship.
In New France (now Canada) he faced
cold, isolation, hunger, mutiny, corruption, war, and other hardships almost
beyond imagining. Among his many accomplishments, what stands out is perhaps the balanced relationship that
Champlain formed with the indigenous
people. He had an insatiable curiosity
about the complex Indian cultures he
encountered and was genuinely interested in what he could learn from them,
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an attitude that resulted in numerous
long-lasting alliances, respect, and trust.
On the eastern side of the Atlantic, he
faced a far different but equally treacherous environment. It took deft and
constant lobbying within the French
court to maintain royal support for his
daring enterprise in the New World.
Champlain did all this, Fischer explains,
not for conquest or riches but “to increase the power and prosperity of
France, to spread the Christian faith, to
learn more about the world, and to
bring together its many people in a
spirit of humanity.” Fischer is scrupulous in his research and in distinguishing established fact from assertions
based on less-certain accounts. His
book includes sixteen appendixes addressing such diverse subjects as Champlain’s separate voyages, the essay he
wrote on leadership in 1632, his ships
and boats, and the Indian nations in
Champlain’s world. There are also
thirty-six pages of “memories of Champlain” that explore images and interpretations of the man from 1608 to 2008.
Fischer concludes his commanding
work with 161 pages of notes, bibliography, and credits.
Fischer’s prodigious research persuaded
him that Champlain was a dreamer,
who imagined “a New World where
people lived at peace with others unlike
themselves.” In this grand book Fischer
superbly tells the story of Champlain
the man, who surmounted the challenges he faced with fairness, prudence,
and faithfulness to his dream.
WILLIAM CALHOUN

Naval War College
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